TROLL OR NO TROLL? POLICING PATENT
USAGE WITH AN OPEN POST-GRANT REVIEW
DAVID G. BARKER1

ABSTRACT
In December 2004, a mystery business, JGR Acquisitions Inc.,
purchased the patent portfolio of bankrupt Commerce One at
auction. Commerce One had not previously enforced the acquired
patents and many companies were using the patented technologies
at the time of the auction. Patent watchdog groups argued that
JGR—a potential patent troll formed solely to purchase Commerce
One’s patents—should not be able to use the patents as a vehicle to
extract licensing fees and that the patents should lapse into the
public domain. Under current law, however, there is no provision
for patents to be invalidated merely because they are used in a
manner that discourages innovation. This iBrief argues that in
order to keep patent trolls from stifling innovation and to protect
legitimate patent holders, the Patent and Trademark Office should
require an open post-grant review whenever patents are renewed
or sold.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
Intellectual property development is surging in the United States
and nowhere is this more evident than in the field of patents.2 Currently,
patents are being granted on a variety of inventions ranging from online
shopping carts3 to cantilever-free magnetic resonance force microscopes.4
At the same time patents are being granted on a wider range of inventions,
the potential uses for granted patents are expanding beyond the traditional
applications.5 Historically, patents were issued to “increase the incentive to
1
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See, e.g. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 28 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004)
[hereinafter “A PATENT SYSTEM”], available at
http://www.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/0309089107.pdf.
3
U.S. Patent No. 5,715,314 (issued Feb. 3, 1998) (the name of the patent is
“Network sales system”); see ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION’S PATENT BUSTING PROJECT, at http://www.eff.com/patent/ (last
visited Jan. 29, 2005) [hereinafter “PATENT BUSTING PROJECT”].
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invent by conferring the right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling the invention in exchange for foregoing secrecy by publishing the
invention, making the information available for others to build upon.”6
Today, however, individuals and firms are purchasing patents in order to
strategically enforce the inventor’s rights.7
¶2
One form of strategic enforcement encompasses purchasing a patent
for the sole purpose of receiving licensing fees.8
This type of
enforcement—potentially a case of patent trolling—may have been JGR
Acquisitions Inc.’s (JGR) goal when it purchased Commerce One’s patent
portfolio. Commerce One was founded in 1994 and its focus was on
developing electronic commerce software applications.9 The company
encountered financial difficulties, however, and was forced to sell a number
of its patents at a bankruptcy auction. The seven patents and thirty-two
patent applications Commerce One sold covered a broad spectrum of
electronic communication and web service technologies and standards.10
The technologies these patents covered remain widely used by companies
such as IBM and Microsoft.11
¶3
On December 6, 2004, JGR purchased the rights to the patented
technologies for $15.5 million at the bankruptcy auction.12 Interestingly,
JGR was incorporated on December 1, 2004,13 possibly for the sole purpose
of purchasing the Commerce One patents.14 While JGR’s owners remain
unknown, some have speculated that IBM and Microsoft were involved.15

Jason Schultz of the Electronic Frontier Foundation stated, “[t]hese
patents, in the wrong hands, would be used to shake down any companies
that operate in Web services and use standards.”16 One of the inventors
¶4

6

Id. at 35.
See id. at 31, 35.
8
A traditional use would be to purchase the patent in order to use the technology
and receive licensing fees. See generally id. at 31-38.
9
John Markoff, Auction of Internet Commerce Patents Draws Concern, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2004, at C4.
10
Renee Boucher Ferguson, Commerce One Auctioned Off; Will Patents be
Used for Commercial Gain?, EWEEK, Dec. 13, 2004, at 24.
11
Markoff, supra note 9.
12
Victoria Slind-Flor, Who Done It?; At a Patent Auction in December, a
Mysterious Bidder Takes Home a $15.5 Million Patent Portfolio, 5 IP L. & BUS.,
Jan. 5, 2005, at 14.
13
Ferguson, supra note 10.
14
See Slind-Flor, supra note 12 (describing several companies which were
formed solely for the purpose of bidding on the patents or used names
specifically established for the auction).
15
Id. (IBM declined any involvement with JGR, but Microsoft declined to
comment).
16
Ferguson, supra note 10.
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named on the patents, Robert Glushko, believed the patents should no
longer be enforceable.17 He claimed Commerce One intended to create a
public standard with the patents and not restrict public use of the
technologies.18 Given the clear intentions of the inventors, Glushko believes
the patented technologies may actually have lapsed into the public
domain.19
In order to prevent potential licensing terrorism20—strategically
enforcing patents intended for public use—and to provide stability and
predictability for inventors using the patent system, new legislation
modifying the Patent Act21 is necessary. The Patent Quality Assistance Act
(PQAA),22 introduced in November of 2004, would modify the Patent Act
“to improve patent quality, deter abusive practices by unscrupulous patent
holders, and provide meaningful, low-cost alternatives to litigation for
challenging the patent validity” through a post-grant review procedure.23
This iBrief proposes another aspect of a post-grant review that would
prevent patented technology from being exploited by patent trolls and
protect legitimate patent holders. Specifically, the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) should review patents in two situations: (1) at the time when
the renewal fee for a patent is due and (2) anytime a patent is sold. Part I
demonstrates the adverse effects of patent trolls on the patent system and
presents a situation where seemingly troll-like behavior is nonetheless
desirable. Part II explains the legal principles an open review would be
founded upon, addresses procedural aspects of an open review, and applies
an open review procedure to two real-world examples.
¶5

I. PERNICIOUS PATENT TROLLS OR LEGITIMATE PATENT
ENFORCERS?
¶6
In order to understand the desirability and benefits of an open
review, it is necessary to define both the type of behavior the open review
would prohibit and the type of behavior it would continue to allow. Ideally,
the open review would limit patent enforcement by patent trolls while
protecting the patent enforcement of legitimate patent holders.

17
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Markoff, supra note 9.
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See Jason Schultz, When Dot-Com Patents Go Bad, SALON.COM, Dec. 13,
2004 (comparing this type of licensing to cold war terrorism), at
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2004/12/13/patent_reform/.
21
35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000).
22
Patent Quality Assistance Act of 2004, H.R. 5299, 108th Cong. (2004).
23
150 Cong. Rec. E1935 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2004) (statement of Rep. Berman).
18
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A. Patent Trolls Deter Innovation
¶7
There are two types of patent trolls: individuals and corporations.
An individual patent troll is a patent holder who receives a patent and then
secretly waits for another inventor to develop the same technology.24 When
this happens, the troll appears and demands licensing fees for the use of the
patented technology. The troll, however, never markets the technology or
makes expenditures to develop the invention.25 He merely waits for the
industry to grow up around the patent so he can then extract licensing fees
from the unsuspecting infringers. Similarly, corporate patent trolls purchase
patents and do not enforce them until the relevant industry has grown up
around the patent. Some commentators have described corporate patent
trolls as “patent system bottom feeders” who buy “improvidently-granted
patents from distressed companies for the sole purpose of suing legitimate
businesses.”26
¶8
The National Research Council of the National Academies lists four
effects patent trolls have on innovation and competition:

(1) In contrast to incentives to genuine innovation, patents on trivial
innovations may confer market power or allow firms to use legal
resources aggressively as a competitive weapon without consumer
benefit. (2) Poor patents could encourage more charges of
infringement and litigation, raising transaction costs. (3) The
proliferation of low-quality patents in a technology complicates and
raises the cost of licensing or avoiding infringement. (4) The
uncertainty about the validity of previously issued patents may deter
investment in innovation and/or distort its direction.27
¶9
A further deterrence to investment in innovation occurs when trolls
purchase patents which have not previously been enforced and suddenly
begin enforcing them.28 This deterrence could potentially occur in the case
24

Id.
Id.
26
Patent Quality Improvement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Courts, the
Internet and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 198th
Cong. 21 (2003) (quoted in Mark D. Janis, Ideas into Action: Implementing
Reform of the Patent System: Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: The
“Dubious Preponderance”, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 923, n.1 (2004)
[hereinafter Janis I]).
27
A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 95.
28
This deterrence to innovation is the motivation for the type of open review
proposed here. The current proposals for an open review are motivated by
validity concerns—not by how valid patents have been used. See, e.g., id. at 6-7
(“The grounds for a challenge could be any of the statutory standards—novelty,
utility, non-obviousness, disclosure or enablement—or even the case law
proscription on patenting abstract ideas and natural phenomena”); FED. TRADE
25
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of the Commerce One patents, which up until the bankruptcy auction had
never been enforced. Companies infringing a troll’s technology probably
do so because they are unaware of the patent or believe they have
permission to use the technology.
¶10
Under the current patent system, when a troll begins enforcing his
patent, companies who are using the troll’s technology are virtually
compelled to pay a licensing fee because a finding of infringement would
result in the automatic issuance of a permanent injunction and other
penalties.29 The PQAA would allow courts to weigh all the equities
involved in order to determine whether or not a permanent injunction
against the alleged infringer is proper.30 However, this might not be
sufficient deterrence for troll-like behavior because the costs of litigation
are often greater than the licensing fees the troll requests.31 Because
litigation is not a sufficient deterrent for patent trolls, an effective, low cost
alternative is needed. An open review would provide such an alternative.

B. Some Troll-Like Behavior is Necessary to Protect Legitimate
Patent Enforcers
¶11
While an open review would eliminate most current troll-like
behavior, it must not be so severely tailored as to impose significant
additional costs on legitimate patent purchasers. In some cases patent
holders lack the resources to apply their patented technology and enforce
their patent rights. An open review must be sufficiently flexible to allow
other entities interested in utilizing the patented technology to acquire the
patent rights and enforce them.

COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, Executive Summary at 7-8 (2003) [hereinafter
FTC REPORT] (“At a minimum, patent challengers should be able to raise issues
of novelty, nonobviousness, written description, enablement, and utility.”), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
29
A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 6-7.
30
See id.; H.R. 5299, 108th Cong. § 6 (2004) (“Grounds for Granting Injunction
– A court shall not grant an injunction under this section unless it finds that the
patentee is likely to suffer irreparable harm that cannot be remedied by payment
of money damages. In making or rejecting such a finding, the court shall not
presume the existence of irreparable harm, but rather the court shall consider
and weigh evidence, if any, tending to establish or negate any equitable factor
relevant to a determination of the existence of irreparable harm, including, but
not limited to, the extent to which the patentee makes use of the technology
claimed by the patent.”).
31
See, e.g., Timothy Aeppel Patent Dispute Embroils Host of Industries, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 21, 2004, at B1 (citing several companies who have decided to pay
licensing fees for an allegedly illegitimate patent because the licensing fee is
much less than potential litigation costs).
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The desirability of such patent purchases is demonstrated by the
conditions surrounding Eli Whitney’s cotton gin. Whitney received a patent
for the cotton gin in 1794.32 Prior to Whitney’s invention, one farm worker
could produce one pound of cotton lint per day by hand. However, with the
advent of the cotton gin, one worker was able to produce nearly fifty times
that amount.33 Before Whitney invented the gin, the South was exporting
487,000 pounds of cotton to England per year. One year after the cotton
gin, that number increased to 1.6 million pounds.34 By the time Whitney
died in 1825, cotton exports to England alone reached 171 million pounds.35
In 1850, Thomas Macaulay noted, “What Peter the Great did to make
Russia dominant, Eli Whitney’s invention of the gin has more than equaled
in its relation to the power and progress of the United States.”36 The cotton
gin was a useful, novel and nonobvious invention, meeting the criteria for
patentability.
¶12

¶13
Despite the commercial success of the gin, however, Whitney had
trouble enforcing his exclusive rights to the invention. By 1804 Whitney
had filed sixty patent infringement suits in Georgia alone, but had been
unsuccessful in all of these actions.37 In response to the rampant
infringement Whitney said, “I have a set of the most Depraved villains to
combat and I might almost as well go to Hell in search of Happiness as
apply to a Georgia-Court for Justice.”38
¶14
Scientific progress was accomplished in granting Whitney the
patent on the cotton gin because he was required to disclose the invention.
This disclosure enabled society, as well as scores of infringers, to benefit
from the technology. However, innovation was stifled because Whitney
had little time to invent anything else while pursuing the pointless
litigation.39 In any case, if Whitney had ever invented something else, he
would not have likely applied for a patent, but instead relied on trade secret
laws to protect his interests. Thus, in the case of the cotton gin, the goal of
the Patent Act to incentivize future innovation was not achieved.
¶15
While it is possible that another individual with greater resources
than Whitney would have been no more effective at obtaining favorable

32

Stephen Yafa, The Man Who Made Cotton King, INVENTION & TECH., Winter
2005, at 50-51.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 57.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 53.
37
Id. at 51.
38
Id. at 52 (emphasis in original).
39
Id.at 57. By the end of his life, Whitney had turned to musket manufacturing,
and helped contribute to the idea of mass marketing with interchangeable parts.
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judgments in court,40 a more skillful and powerful negotiator could have
obtained some licensing fees from infringers. Because Whitney was
legitimately trying to enforce his patent rights, and the infringers knew he
doing so, he should have been allowed to sell his patent and recover his
investment. The purchase price would have provided Whitney a portion of
the economic benefit derived from his invention and created the incentive
for him to invent again.
¶16
The cotton gin and other similar examples show why there should
be no blanket rule that one person cannot acquire and enforce another’s
patent. Not every patent acquirer who enforces a patent is a patent troll.
Anyone who purchased the cotton gin patent would not have been doing
anything unexpected by continuing to pursue licensing fees from people
who were infringing the cotton gin. In such situations, the incentive to
invent grows because inventors realize that if they are not successful in
enforcing their patents, the patents still might have some value as a salable
business product.
¶17
One major difference between the cotton gin hypothetical and
Commerce One’s patent auction is in the public’s perception of the patented
technology prior to the sale. In the case of the cotton gin, cotton farmers
knew they were using the cotton gin technology against the wishes of Eli
Whitney.41 However, in the case of the Commerce One patents, the public
expected to have free use of the technology covered by the Commerce One
patents based on communications by the inventors.42 Given these
differences, one issue that should be addressed in assessing the propriety of
patent purchases is whether the public can reasonably expect the original
patent holder to enforce his patent at the time of the sale? If yes, then the
patent purchaser is justified in enforcing the patent, but if no, then the
purchaser should not be able to enforce the patent. Innovation is
unjustifiably stifled if people who had been legally using patented
technology to produce new technology may no longer do so—or can use it
only after paying significant licensing fees.
¶18
Admittedly, in the cotton gin example commercial success might
have been stifled had another party suddenly been successful in enforcing
the patents,43 but the infringers were on notice of their actions. Whatever
commercial success the infringers lost would have been justified by the
purpose of the Patent Act.44 If the exclusive rights guaranteed by the Patent
40

See id. at 52. It appears the Georgia courts were set on denying Whitney, or
anyone else, rights associated with the cotton gin patent.
41
See id.
42
See Markoff, supra note 9.
43
Processing cotton today employs substantially the same process as invented
by Whitney in 1794. See . Yafa, supra note 32, at 54, 56.
44
See A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 35.
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Act become unstable or uncertain, initial inventions, such as the cotton gin,
would not be available for subsequent improvements. Ultimately,
innovation will suffer.45

II. GETTING RID OF THE TROLL AND PROTECTING THE LEGITIMATE
ENFORCER THROUGH AN OPEN REVIEW
¶19
In order to prevent patent trolls from deterring innovation and
protect legitimate patent enforcers, an open post-grant review should be
available as an alternative to costly litigation. Patent trolls should be unable
to capitalize on market uncertainty by allowing others to unknowingly
develop infringing technologies while waiting in the wings to subsequently
appear and extract licensing fees. At the same time, as demonstrated in the
previous section, a patentee should be able to sell his patent rights in certain
situations and the purchaser should be able to enforce the patentee’s rights.
The best way to achieve this balance is to introduce legislation requiring the
PTO to conduct an open review of a patent whenever a patent is renewed or
sold.

A. Open Review Based on the Equitable Principles of Laches and
Estoppel
Because the most effective way to currently challenge a
questionable patent is through costly litigation, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has recommended “an administrative procedure for
post-grant review and opposition that allows for meaningful challenges to
patent validity short of federal court litigation.”46 The FTC’s review would
be substantially broader than the current inter-partes reexamination
provided for in the Patent Act.47 It would allow a challenger to at least
challenge novelty, nonobviousness, written description, enablement, and
utility.48 The FTC’s review would be much shorter than current litigation
¶20

45

See FTC REPORT, supra note 28, Executive Summary at 1-3.
Id. at 7-8.
47
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-18 (2000). For a general critique of the inter-partes
proceeding, see Mark D. Janis, Inter Partes Patent Reexamination, 10 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 481 (2000) [hereinafter Janis II]. Janis says,
“To put it pointedly, inter partes reexamination is a dog. Its substantive scope is
too narrow, its procedural assurances of meaningful third-party participation are
questionably, its appeal provisions are too limited, and its estoppel provisions
are excessive.” Id. at 498.
48
FTC REPORT, supra note 28, Executive Summary at 8 n.26; see also A
PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 6-7 (“The grounds for a challenge could be
any of the statutory standards—novelty, utility, non-obviousness, disclosure or
enablement—or even the case law proscription on patenting abstract ideas and
natural phenomena.”).
46
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and would also provide a wider range of remedies than courts currently
provide.49
¶21
While the FTC’s review is certainly a step in the right direction, the
open review proposed by this iBrief would not focus on statutory validity,
but instead on equitable validity. This system would allow challenges to
patent validity based on how a patent had been used. Such an open review
would be based on two equitable principles which are currently affirmative
defenses to patent infringement claims: laches50 and estoppel.51
¶22
The seminal United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
case A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co.52 discusses the
current state of the law regarding laches and estoppel in patent infringement
actions.53 Aukerman owned patents covering a method and device used in
pouring concrete highway barriers.54 Chaides purchased one of the devices
and was informed by Aukerman in 1979 that it needed to sign a license
agreement for the method patent.55 Chaides responded that Aukerman
could sue if it wished but the amount of damages would be low and not
worth Aukerman’s time.56 Aukerman took no further action until 1987
when it learned that Chaides was a competitor of one of its licensees.57
Aukerman subsequently filed an infringement action against Chaides in

49

See A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 95-96, 98 (Patent litigation typically
does not occur until seven to ten years after the patent is granted, and might take
up to three years to complete. An open proceeding could be resolved in as little
as one year.).
50
“1. Unreasonable delay in pursuing a right or claim—almost always an
equitable one—in a way that prejudices the party against whom relief is sought.
. . . 2. The equitable doctrine by which a court denies relief to a claimant who
has unreasonably delayed in asserting the claim, when that delay has prejudiced
the party against whom relief is sought.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed.
2004).
51
“1. A bar that prevents one from asserting a claim or right that contradicts
what one has said or done before or what has been legally established as true. . .
. 3. An affirmative defense alleging good-faith reliance on a misleading
representation and an injury or detrimental change in position resulting from that
reliance.” Id.
52
960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
53
See John B. Campbell, A Decade of Aukerman: An Analysis of Laches and
Estoppel in the Federal Circuit, 43 IDEA 299 (2003) (discussing Aukerman and
how the Federal Circuit has applied it).
54
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1026.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 1026-27.
57
Id. at 1027.

2005

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 9

1988.58 In defense of its actions, Chaides raised the defenses of laches and
estoppel.
1. Laches
¶23
The Federal Circuit held that where laches is established no claim
for damages exists prior to the filing of the lawsuit.59 Where a patentee
delays bringing a lawsuit for six years laches is presumed, but before six
years there is no presumption.60 A presumption of laches only forces the
patentee to come forward with some evidence showing he did not
unreasonably delay a claim for relief. The defendant still has the burden of
persuasion for the affirmative defense.61
¶24
Courts weigh all the equities to determine if laches should bar prefiling damages.62 Two factors a court may consider include “(1) whether
the plaintiff delayed filing suit for an unreasonable and inexcusable length
of time from the time the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known
of its claim against the defendant and (2) whether the delay operated to the
prejudice or injury of the defendant.”63

If laches is established, the patent holder cannot receive damages
prior to the filing of the lawsuit.64 The patent holder may, however, receive
an injunction against future acts of infringement and damages resulting
from that infringement once the lawsuit is filed.65 The injunction does not
carry over to infringing products the defendant sold before the lawsuit was
filed—those products essentially receive a free license.66
¶25

¶26
Ultimately a court will weigh all the equities to determine whether
the delay by the plaintiff was unreasonable and inexcusable. In Aukerman,
a delay of nine years was not held to be inexcusable because the Federal
Circuit determined the district court had failed to properly allocate the
burden of proof.67 In other cases, however, a delay as short as three years
has been found unreasonable and inexcusable.68

2. Estoppel
58

Id.
Id. at 1028.
60
Id.
61
Id. See Campbell, supra note 53, at 311-13 for a more in depth discussion of
how the presumption of laches can be overcome.
62
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028.
63
Id. at 1032 (quoting Costello v. United States, 356 U.S. 265, 282 (1961)).
64
Cambell, supra note 53, at 306.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 311.
67
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1039.
68
Campbell, supra note 53, at 311.
59
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The Federal Circuit held that the defendant in a patent suit must
establish the following three factors by a preponderance of the evidence in
order to succeed on an estoppel claim:69
¶27

a. The patentee, through misleading conduct, leads the alleged
infringer to reasonably infer that the patentee does not intend to
enforce its patent against the alleged infringer. “Conduct” may
include specific statements, action, inaction, or silence where there
was an obligation to speak.
b. The alleged infringer relies on that conduct.
c. Due to its reliance, the alleged infringer will be materially
prejudiced if the patentee is allowed to proceed with its claim.70
¶28
A patentee’s conduct is misleading when he indicates to infringers
that he does not intend to enforce his patent. Unlike laches, where the
standard is “knew or reasonably should have known,”71 a patentee must
have actually been aware of the infringement for the infringer to succeed
with an estoppel defense.72 The patentee need not intend to mislead, but he
must communicate in some way that he will not enforce the patent against
the infringer.73 In order for an estoppel claim to succeed, the infringer must
demonstrate he reasonably relied on this misleading communication; it is
not enough to simply prove the communication occurred.74

In Aukerman, the court held that summary judgment for Chaides
was inappropriate because there was an issue of fact as to whether
“Aukerman’s course of conduct reasonably gave rise to an inference in
Chaides that Aukerman was not going to enforce the . . . patents against
Chaides.”75 Although the length of Aukerman’s delay in filing suit favored
the inference that Aukerman was not going to enforce the patents, other
evidence was not as favorable.76 For example, Chaides might have thought
Aukerman did not file suit because the amount of potential damages was
less than the cost of litigation; however this was not the same as giving up
the right to enforce the patents.77
¶29

69

Id. at 307.
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028.
71
Id. at 1032.
72
Campbell, supra note 53, at 308.
73
Id. at 308.
74
Id. at 309.
75
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1043.
76
Id.
77
Id.
70
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B. Procedural Aspects of the Open Review
The open review proposed here78 would occur whenever a patent is
sold or a patent holder is required to pay maintenance fees to retain his
patent rights.79 The party who purchases the patent would be responsible to
pay for the review and the patent holder80 would have the initial burden of
coming forth with some evidence showing active use and enforcement of
the patent.
¶30

If the patent holder or purchaser does not satisfy the burden of
coming forth with some evidence of valid enforcement, the patent would be
declared invalid and the technology would enter the public domain.81 If,
however, the patent holder or purchaser satisfies the burden of production,
the PTO would issue a public notice and allow third parties, for a limited
time period, to submit contrary evidence which the PTO would review. If
the PTO decides the evidence is sufficient to challenge the assertion of
active enforcement, it would give the challengers the option to initiate an
adverse proceeding between the patentee and any challengers. Only then, if
the challengers decide to proceed, would the identity of the challengers be
made known to the patentee.82
¶31

¶32
The proceeding would be similar to a declaratory judgment action
of invalidity and the challengers would have the burden of proof.83 The
challengers would be required to prove elements similar to those of laches
and estoppel discussed above. However, instead of being elements of an
affirmative defense, they would become the elements of the challenger’s

78

The section deals with procedural aspects unique to the open review proposed
here (as opposed to the FTC review or the review proposed by the NRC) unless
otherwise noted.
79
A patent holder must pay a maintenance fee following the third, seventh and
eleventh years after a patent has issued. A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 31.
If the maintenance fees are not paid, the patent expires and the technology
becomes part of the public domain. See id.
80
Either the patentee or the patent purchaser would pay for the review.
81
The PTO already lists all patents on its website (http://www.uspto.gov/). A
listing of expired patents—those which were not renewed at the appropriate
time—and those patents which are invalidated through the open review could
also be listed.
82
A challenger might refrain from presenting important evidence to the PTO to
prevent the patentee from knowing of a possible infringer. Anonymity until the
PTO decides there is a triable issue would help to alleviate some of this concern.
This is discussed further below.
83
For a discussion of the current presumption of validity in patent infringement
actions and an argument that the burden of proof should be relaxed from a clear
and convincing standard to a preponderance standard, see Janis I, supra note 26.
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cause of action. The two factors for laches84 and the three factors for
estoppel85 would be taken into account; yet, the claims would retain their
equitable nature and allow the judge to consider all elements of the case.
Similar to other proposed third-party reviews, the proceeding would
be held in front of an administrative patent judge who would have greater
legal training than most patent examiners.86 The FTC and the National
Research Council of the National Academies have written detailed
descriptions of the procedural aspects of such an open review.87
¶33

¶34
The additional cost associated with the open review could be
reflected in the purchase price of the patent. Depending on the
circumstances, these additional costs may reduce the purchase price of the
patent, making the sale less desirable in the eyes of the patent seller. It
would also make the patent buyer more cautious in determining which
patents to buy. If a potential buyer knows he will have to go through an
open review, the buyer would likely only purchase patents that have a high
likelihood of surviving the review. Also, when a patent is up for renewal, if
the patentee knows he has not been enforcing the patent, it would be
unlikely he would try to renew it. This would help to reduce troll-like
behavior for both patentees and patent purchasers.
¶35
The open review proposed here presents advantages over other
proposed third-party reviews. Current proposals for an open review first
require third parties to come forward with evidence to challenge statutory
validity.88 However, there is a significant drawback to third-party-initiated
proceedings: if the challenger looses in front of the PTO, the patent holder
is alerted to a potential infringer—a losing challenger is essentially
“’paint[ing] big targets on [himself]’ by actively opposing others’
patents.”89 The current proposals by the FTC and the National Research
Council of the National Academies provide for appellate review with the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences and Federal Circuit,90 but a
challenger might still be wary of an adverse result on appeal and subsequent

84

See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1032
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
85
See id. at 1028.
86
See A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 97-98 (giving a detailed listing of the
process involved in a third-party review); FTC REPORT, supra note 28, Chp. 5,
at 17.
87
See A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 95-103; FTC REPORT, supra note 28,
Chp. 5, at 15-23.
88
See A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 97.
89
FTC REPORT, supra note 28, Chp. 5, at 18.
90
A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 101; FTC REPORT, supra note 28, Chp. 5,
at 17.
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lawsuits.91 PTO Director Q. Todd Dickinson supports such a review
procedure, but says independent inventors fear competitors will use these
proceedings to “impede their ability to assert their patents.”92 The open
review proposed here would alleviate some of these concerns by allowing
third parties to wait until the PTO initiates the open review.
¶36
To further alleviate concerns of third parties becoming “big
targets,”93 the submissions from third parties could be anonymous to protect
concerns about subsequent litigation.94 The identity of the challenger would
not be made known to the patentee until the PTO determines there is an
issue. Some have proposed allowing the challenger to re-litigate issues in a
subsequent infringement action if the challenger is unsuccessful in front of
the PTO; the challenger would only be estopped from re-litigating the issues
if he decides to appeal the PTO’s decision to the Federal Circuit.95

C. Application of an Open Review to Commerce One and the Cotton
Gin
A general analysis of the open review proposed here can be made
with regards to the Commerce One and cotton gin examples.96 First
addressing the Commerce One patents, JGR would pay the sale fee to the
PTO and present any evidence that Commerce One had been enforcing its
patents and looking for potential infringers. Currently, it does not appear
any such evidence exists because companies like IBM and Microsoft have
been using the technologies97 based on communications from Commerce
One. Aware of this burden, it is possible that JGR would not have paid so
much for, or even purchased, the patents in the first place.
¶37

Companies using the patented technology would then present
evidence concerning their usage after the PTO issued a public notice of the
¶38
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See FTC REPORT, supra note 28, Chp. 5, at 16, 18.
Id.
93
Id. at 18.
94
The currently available inter-partes reexamination procedure is rarely used
because there are several estoppel provisions that restrict challengers’ rights to
relitigate issues after an adverse decision by the PTO. See A PATENT SYSTEM,
supra note 2, at 96; see generally Janis II, supra note 47 (discussing the different
estoppel provisions).
95
See FTC REPORT, supra note 28, Chp. 5, at 17.
96
The open review would be similar procedurally to those reviews proposed by
the FTC and the National Research Council of the National Academies. See A
PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 95-103; FTC REPORT, supra note 28, Chp. 5,
at 15-23.
97
See Markoff, supra note 9.
92
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sale.98 Evidence of usage would include the length of time the companies
had been using the patented technology and other relevant factors
concerning the inventor’s intent for the patent. For example, Robert
Glushko’s statements relating Commerce One’s intent not to restrict public
use of his patents would be introduced. 99 The PTO would then make a
determination whether or not to allow the infringing companies to pursue an
adversarial adjudication of the patents’ validity.
¶39
At trial, the challenging companies would need to prove the
elements of laches and estoppel discussed in the previous section.
Regarding laches, they would call employees of Commerce One, like
Glushko, to testify that they knew of the infringements, but had no desire to
pursue litigation because they wanted the public to use the patented
technologies. This would likely be dispositive of the first factor of laches—
delaying suit an inexcusable length of time after the patentee knew of
infringement.100 As for prejudice,101 the challenging companies would
demonstrate the extensive use of the patented technologies and the effects
that unpredicted licensing fees would have on the electronic commerce
industry.102
¶40
Commerce One employees could also testify regarding the first
factor of estoppel: that Commerce One specifically intended for the public
to use the patents without paying licensing fees and that they communicated
this to the public.103 If JGR were now allowed to enforce the patents,
Commerce One’s prior communications would have been misleading.104
The last two factors, reliance and prejudice,105 would be similar to the proof
for the last factor of laches. Although it would be an equitable
determination and the judge could place more weight on specific factors, it
does not appear there is any evidence that would support a finding of
validity.

Turning to the cotton gin example, it does not appear there would
be any opportunity for third parties to present evidence Whitney was not
attempting to enforce his patents. Any purchaser could simply point to all
¶41
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As in most cases where a valuable or controversial patent is sold, the public
notice by the PTO would likely not be necessary because the potentially affected
parties would already know of the sale.
99
Slind-Flor, supra note 12.
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See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co., 960 F.2d 1020,
1032 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
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See id.
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the litigation associated with the patent. The sixty filed lawsuits would
likely be sufficient evidence to prove that Whitney was vigorously trying to
enforce his rights under the patent. The patent purchaser would only have
to pay the fee for the sale review and he could then enforce his rights to the
cotton gin.

CONCLUSION
¶42
Since more and more patents are being granted and used
strategically, there is widespread concern that some patent holders might be
stifling innovation through troll-like behavior. In order to limit troll-like
behavior, there must be an alternative to costly litigation that could
invalidate patents that are used improperly. The solution must make an
effective balance between competition and patent rights so that neither
commerce nor innovation suffers unduly.
¶43
The PTO should achieve this balance by making a preliminary
determination regarding patent enforcement practices whenever a patent is
renewed or sold. In cases where the PTO determines there is not sufficient
evidence to show consistent enforcement, third parties would then present
evidence and challenge the patent’s validity in an open review procedure. If
the challengers are successful in proving the elements of laches and
estoppel, then the patent would be invalidated.

Requiring an open review would reduce instances of patent trolllike behavior without placing too much of a burden on holders of legitimate
patents. Troll-like behavior would decrease because patents would lose
some of their strength as a strategic weapon. At the same time, valid
patents would become more valuable, either to the patentee or to a
legitimate purchaser. Innovation would increase, and technology that
should belong to the public would not be available for exploitation by patent
trolls.
¶44

